Book

War on the Ballot Box: How Violent Actors
Corrupt and Disrupt Democracy

(Under contract, Cambridge University Press)

Armed non-state actors frequently intervene in democratic politics, producing waves of political violence against voters, candidates, and elected officials around the world. How should we understand the motivations behind these interventions and their consequences? In War on the Ballot Box, I argue that armed actors face a tradeoff between two impulses: to discredit democracy as a political project or to bend elections and the policymaking process to their political agenda. I identify four strategies by which armed groups navigate this tradeoff, each of which prescribes distinct forms of coercion or collaboration with respect to voters, elections, and elected officials.

I evaluate this theory against a range of empirical evidence from Latin America. Drawing on a trove of documents produced by hundreds of militant groups across the region, I unpack how these organizations understood democracy and its viability for achieving their political aims. I then turn to a set of multi-method case studies of insurgent, paramilitary, and criminal groups in Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. I analyze what each group sought to gain from violently manipulating democracy, and trace the effects of their interventions for elections, policy outcomes, and public faith in democracy. A concluding chapter draws out implications for theories of political violence, democracy, and the state, and suggests policy prescriptions for protecting democracy in the face of violence.

This book offers a range of contributions to our understanding of political violence and democratic politics. It provides an explanation for a tragically common but under-theorized form of political violence: that enacted by non-state actors against mayors, legislators, and other elected officials. Its findings underscore the vital importance of taking seriously the causal role of ideology in models of contentious politics. And they raise profound questions for democratic theory. Democracy is commonly theorized as an alternative to violent claimmaking, a means of channeling political conflict toward peaceful compromise. But for the armed actors I study, coercive might and democratic influence supplement and buttress each other. Democracy may fail to achieve its pacific aspirations because ballots and bullets are not substitutes but complements.

War on the Ballot Box is based on my doctoral dissertation, which won the 2025 Juan Linz Prize for the Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy. I anticipate publication in fall 2027.